{"id":736,"date":"2026-10-18T00:50:28","date_gmt":"2026-10-17T22:50:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.gaetanointrieri.com\/?p=736"},"modified":"2026-10-18T00:51:12","modified_gmt":"2026-10-17T22:51:12","slug":"enav-il-costo-della-fragilita-tariffe-elevate-e-disservizi-che-penalizzano-il-trasporto-aereo-italiano","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.gaetanointrieri.com\/en\/2026\/10\/18\/enav-il-costo-della-fragilita-tariffe-elevate-e-disservizi-che-penalizzano-il-trasporto-aereo-italiano\/","title":{"rendered":"ENAV, the Cost of Fragility: High Charges and Service Disruptions Undermining Italian Air Transport"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a><\/p>\r\n

In 2018, as part of my work with the Technical Mission Unit of Italy\u2019s Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, I prepared an analysis of ENAV\u2019s assets, financial position and economic performance, which also examined critical aspects of its stock market listing.<\/p>\r\n

The central issue was the balance between the public-service mission of essential infrastructure operating under a system of public designation and regulation, and the financial objectives of a listed company.<\/p>\r\n

The report examined dividend policy, investment planning, charging mechanisms, the effects of dividing airports into terminal charging bands, and the role of public authorities.<\/p>\r\n

Eight years later, the disruption of 16 October 2026 requires us to revisit that discussion. A technical failure does not automatically substantiate every concern raised at the time. It does, however, bring renewed urgency to the question running through that report: are financial and operational priorities structured to ensure, first and foremost, the continuity and reliability of the service?<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

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16 October: Reduced Capacity and Recovery Through the Alternative Network<\/h2>\r\n

According to ENAV\u2019s statements, anomalies affecting its wide-area data transmission network led to air traffic management capacity being reduced to 50%. Use of the secondary satellite network subsequently allowed capacity to reach 75%. Restoration of the primary network eventually enabled a return to 100%. The company stated that operational safety had been maintained throughout the event.<\/p>\r\n

These facts must be described precisely. A reduction in capacity to 50% does not mean that half of all flights were necessarily cancelled, or that every airport experienced the same restriction.<\/p>\r\n

Similarly, referring generically to a \u201cradar failure\u201d does not accurately describe the problem publicly identified by ENAV, which concerned the data transmission network supporting air traffic control services.<\/p>\r\n

Restricting traffic to preserve safety is necessary. The assessment must focus on what made that restriction essential: the initial failure, its consequences, the capacity of alternative configurations and recovery times.<\/p>\r\n

Maintaining safety during a failure is a fundamental requirement. Limiting the degradation of service is another essential aspect of performance that must be measured.<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

The Issue Raised in 2018: A Listed Company Providing an Essential Service<\/h2>\r\n

The 2018 report raised concerns about the risk that the focus on returns to capital might take precedence over the public-service role of air navigation services.<\/p>\r\n

In particular, it examined the reduction in share capital and the use of reserves during the listing process, distribution policies and the need to make the benefits of investment verifiable.<\/p>\r\n

Those concerns belong to that document and the context in which it was written. Assessing them today requires up-to-date financial statements, corporate records, regulatory data and operational results.<\/p>\r\n

One point also needs clarification: the European system provides for returns on capital, incentives and risk-sharing mechanisms. It is therefore incorrect to suggest that air navigation service providers are subject to a blanket prohibition on profits or dividends. The question is how those returns align with recognised costs, performance targets and the quality of service actually delivered to users.<\/p>\r\n

The operational question remains entirely relevant: what resources are being allocated to reducing vulnerabilities, and how is their effectiveness demonstrated?<\/p>\r\n

Dividends: A Legitimate Decision That Requires Scrutiny of Priorities<\/h2>\r\n

On 14 May 2026, ENAV\u2019s shareholders approved a dividend for the 2025 financial year of \u20ac156.7 million, equivalent to \u20ac0.29 per share. A dividend of \u20ac146.2 million had been approved for 2024.<\/p>\r\n

The distribution of these amounts does not establish that funding was diverted from a specific project, nor does it demonstrate a causal link with the failure of 16 October.<\/p>\r\n

It does, however, require rigorous reporting on priorities: which investments in operational continuity have been completed, what results they have delivered and which residual risks had been accepted.<\/p>\r\n

The relationship between dividends and resilience cannot be assessed simply by treating them as opposing choices. It must be examined through programmes, deadlines, testing and performance.<\/p>\r\n

An announced investment must translate into demonstrable operational capability.<\/p>\r\n

Technology Investment: Delivery Must Be Measured Against Commitments<\/h2>\r\n

My 2018 analysis examined the 4-Flight programme, the timetable for renewing systems and the risks associated with extending the use of platforms subject to successive upgrades.<\/p>\r\n

It also addressed decisions concerning international investments, research and domestic technological expertise.<\/p>\r\n

It would be inappropriate to use those assessments to claim that a particular project caused the 2026 failure. A communications network, a flight data processing system and surveillance infrastructure are distinct components, even though they form part of the same operational chain.<\/p>\r\n

The correct approach is to compare commitments made over time with actual delivery: costs, programme changes, entry into service and benefits achieved.<\/p>\r\n

For resilience, the decisive benefit is a reduction in the likelihood and impact of interruptions. Modernisation must also be assessed against this criterion.<\/p>\r\n

Terminal Charging Bands: A Concern Already Raised in 2018<\/h2>\r\n

Another issue addressed in the report was the differentiation of terminal charges.<\/p>\r\n

At the time, the document examined a three-band structure and questioned its effects on airports outside the largest hubs. It highlighted the risk that regional services could be disadvantaged by high charges and decisions to rationalise service provision.<\/p>\r\n

The framework has since changed and should not be confused with the arrangements in place in 2018. In 2026, Italy has two terminal charging zones:<\/p>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n
Italian charging zone<\/th>\r\nAirports<\/th>\r\nTerminal unit rate<\/th>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n
Zone 1<\/td>\r\nRome Fiumicino, Milan Malpensa, Milan Linate, Bergamo and Venice<\/td>\r\n\u20ac177.19<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n
Zone 2<\/td>\r\nIncluding Palermo, Catania, Comiso, Cagliari, Olbia, Alghero, Naples, Bologna, Florence and Pisa<\/td>\r\n\u20ac331.96<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n

The Zone 2 rate is 87.3% higher than the Zone 1 rate. Italy\u2019s en-route unit rate is \u20ac73.71, including EUROCONTROL\u2019s \u20ac0.10 administrative component.<\/p>\r\n

This difference alone does not establish unjustified discrimination: the costs of each zone, traffic volumes and regulatory decisions must be examined.<\/p>\r\n

However, the economic issue is clear. Numerous airports essential to regional and island connectivity fall within the more expensive terminal charging band.<\/p>\r\n

The question raised in 2018 therefore remains relevant: how does this allocation of charges align with the objective of supporting an extensive network of air services across the country?<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

The European Comparison: En-Route and Terminal Charges for the Same Flight<\/h2>\r\n

Looking solely at the en-route unit rate does not reveal how much an airline pays to operate a flight.<\/p>\r\n

We therefore constructed a simulation combining en-route and departure terminal charges over 500 chargeable kilometres, using three aircraft with explicitly stated reference weights:<\/p>\r\n